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This cross-national examination of the motives behind adolescent approval of violence in major cities in Germany and four Eastern European transformation 
societies (Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovenia) draws on Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT), which leads us to expect higher instrumental motivation for viol-
ence among adolescents in the transforming societies. Differences in institutional structure and cultural orientations between Germany and the Eastern Euro-
pean societies are assessed using data from ILO and ESS. Analysis of the different motives for violence is based on data collected by the Criminological 
Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN) in Kraków, Volgograd, Ljubljana, Plzen, and Hamburg. Comparability and cross-cultural interpretability of the violence 
attitude measure is assessed by applying confirmatory factor analyses in multi-group comparisons. A lack of sufficient data meant that specific assumed link-
ages as implied by IAT could not be established, but the results for a specific instrumental/utilitarian motive for violence and for institutional structure and 
cultural orientations point to the utility of applying insights from IAT to understanding the dynamics of violence within the Eastern European context of trans-
formation. We find empirical indications that specific features of the family mediate the “Eastern effect” on the instrumental/utilitarian motive. Further re-
search is needed to discover whether economic dominance affects motives for youth violence indirectly via the socialization provided by non-economic 
institutions rather than directly via cultural orientations.
1. Introduction: Objectives and Theoretical Frame
The recurring theme of youth and violence concerns the so-
cial sciences in all societies, whatever their social and politi-
cal history and situation. The societies of Eastern Europe 
have experienced strong processes of social transformation 
since the collapse of communism, as the rapid implemen -
tation of the free-market economy and the concomitant 
capitalist ideology have wrought changes in value orien-
tations in these societies (Thome 2003, Kim and Pridemore 
2005). Our central question is whether these circumstances 
also have an effect on adolescents’ attitudes to violence.
This contribution is a comparative investigation of the ex-
tent of the motives that lie behind adolescent approval of 
violence in major cities in Germany and in four Eastern 
European transformation societies.
If we are to draw conclusions about the phenomenon of vi-
olence as a whole it makes sense to start with approval of 
violence. We assume that there are different motives for ap-
proval of violence, for example economic/instrumental or 
expressive/hedonistic motives, whereby purposes may 
range from self-defense over revenge or achieving recog-
nition to simply having fun.
As well as Germany (east and west), our comparative analy-
sis of motives for violence encompasses Russia, Poland, 
Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. Despite the many histori-
cal, linguistic, political, and social differences between them, 
we agree with Zhao and Cao (2010) these Eastern European 
countries represent a geographical group whose rapid social 
transformation represents a different context from Germany. 
The transformative process set in motion in these countries 
by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was 
framed by neoliberal global developments and had massive 
repercussions on their political institutions. While East Ger-
many imported its institutional framework from West Ger-
many, which was already a free-market economy, capitalism 
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as the new form of order was implemented very suddenly 
and with full force in the other Eastern European countries.
To interpret our findings we draw on the Institutional 
Anomie Theory (IAT) of Messner and Rosenfeld (1994, 
1997a), which focuses explicitly on the violence-promoting 
role of the economy in situations where it acquires institu -
tional dominance, and is therefore, in our opinion, highly rel-
evant to the Eastern European countries in the period after 
the fall of the Iron Curtain. The limited scope of our study 
precludes a direct test of the IAT, which is not what we set out 
to accomplish, but we do seek to assess the applicability of 
central tenets of IAT for an understanding of adolescents’ at-
titudes toward violence in the investigated countries.
We propose that the dominance of economic institutions in 
Eastern European societies encouraged by the shift to capi-
talism and the corresponding value orientations arising in 
the population create a social climate that especially en-
courages instrumentally motivated violence. This should be 
reflected in higher approval of instrumental violence by 
adolescents in Eastern European cities compared to those 
in the German city of Hamburg.
We begin by describing the IAT in general (section 2), be-
fore applying it specifically to the context of social change 
in Eastern Europe (section 3). A comparative investigation 
of selected indicators for institutional structure and cultu-
ral orientations in Eastern Europe and Germany follows in 
section 4, before finally we examine the motives for adoles-
cent violence in a theory-led comparative investigation 
covering five countries (section 5). The question of cross-
cultural comparability and interpretability of the measured 
latent approval of violence scale will be a central concern 
in this section, and will be investigated by conducting con-
firmatory factor analyses in a multi-group setting.
2. An Outline of Institutional Anomie Theory
Messner and Rosenfeld’s Institutional Anomie Theory 
(IAT) (1994, 1997a) builds on and expands Merton’s 
anomie theory (1938, 1968). Both approaches see the un-
fettered striving for success in capitalist society as the main 
component of an anomic culture that can lead to deviant 
behavior (Bernburg 2002). While Merton deals with fea-
tures of the stratification system (social structure in the 
form of unequal distribution of the legal means to achieve 
the culturally prescribed goal of success) that translate 
anomic culture into deviant behavior, IAT specifies the in-
stitutional configuration that encourages the emergence of 
an anomic culture (Bernburg 2002, 738). This, according to 
Bernburg, brings IAT close to Durkheim’s European 
anomie concept (1893 [1992]), and lends it relevance in 
connection with social change.
The essence of IAT is that high rates of violent crime arise 
especially in capitalist market economies where the econ-
omy comes to dominate those institutions that are not by 
nature orientated to economic criteria (Messner and Ro-
senfeld 1994, 1997a). The focus here is mainly on the ex-
planation of instrumental (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994, 
84), or utilitarian (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008, 32) viol-
ent crime. This may involve not just profit in the narrow 
sense, but also prestige tied to monetary success.
The predominance of the economy and the relative power-
lessness of essentially non-economic institutions such as the 
institution of education or the political system are expressed 
in the devaluation of non-economic functions and roles, the 
accommodation of non-economic institutions to economic 
requirements, and the penetration of economic standards 
into many non-economic institutions. The consequence of 
this is anomie in the sense of a largely unrestrained striving 
for economic success that at least situatively relaxes moral 
constraints. After the weakening of social control by non-
economic institutions, the surviving action-defining criteria 
are primarily economic values such as success orientation 
(great pressure on the individual to achieve goals by any 
means necessary), excessive or egotistical individualism (as 
opposed to Durkheim’s moral individualism [1991]),1 uni-
versalism (where success standards apply equally to all 
1 Moral individualism, which it is argued de-
velops in the course of the modernisation process, 
regulates social relations more strongly through mu-
tual recognition and empathy, which leads overall to 
less violence (Karstedt 2001).
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members of society), and money fetishism (money becomes 
the absolute measure of success) (Messner 2003). Egotistical 
and disintegrative individualism is thus the most fundamen-
tal aspect of the cultural base of anomie in modern societies 
(Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008, 172).
According to IAT, economic dominance with the cor-
responding cultural ancillaries creates a lifeworld that 
fosters criminal and violent behavior. We focus here on the 
assumed connection between economic dominance and 
adolescent approval of violence, surmising that in Eastern 
European societies there will be greater approval of viol-
ence, especially for instrumental motives, than in Germany, 
because we assume that in the transformation societies the 
cultural influence of the economy is less limited by extra-
economic institutions. We next consider whether there is 
evidence for such a manifestation of institutional anomie 
in the transformation societies, first theoretically (section 
3) and then empirically (section 4).
3. IAT and Societal Transformation
Although IAT was not originally conceived for the analysis 
of social transformation, it can also be applied fruitfully to 
the explanation of deviance and violence in that con-
nection. Thome (2003) sees the transformation societies of 
Eastern Europe, with their still underconsolidated demo-
cratic institutions and cultural traditions exposed to the 
forces of a globally unfettered economy, at heightened risk 
of social anomie as described by Durkheim (1893 [1992]). 
Zhao and Cao (2010) are able to confirm this empirically 
for the Eastern European societies with respect to anomie 
at the individual level, measured as the “individual’s ac-
ceptance of legitimacy of five instrumental crime-related 
scenarios” (1217). One consequence of this, they write, is 
the cultural encouragement of excessive individualism. The 
closeness of Messner and Rosenfeld’s anomie concept to 
the social anomie of Durkheim (Bernburg 2002) and the 
way economic institutions primarily direct this specific 
transformation process suggest that IAT will be highly rel-
evant in this context.
The connection between rapid social transformation and 
deviance can be explained very well, as also noted by Bern-
burg (2002), by building on the governing IAT concept of 
institutional imbalance and applying it to the trans-
formation from communist to capitalist societies. Alto-
gether this accords with Polanyi (describing 
transformation occurring during an earlier historical peri-
od) and with Messner and Rosenfeld, who concur that rad-
ical socioeconomic transformation can bring forth massive 
social problems through a “disembedded” (Polanyi 1957), 
and thus dominant economy (Messner and Rosenfeld 
1994). In the process that transformed the Eastern Euro-
pean communist societies into structurally capitalist so-
cieties, their citizens largely adopted the capitalist ideology 
with its dominant values such as striving for success, 
money fetish, etc. (Kim and Pridemore 2005). At the same 
time, for example in Russia through widespread poverty 
and unemployment (World Bank 2000), they have less legal 
opportunity to realize material wishes. Economic depri-
vation and pronounced social inequality can, where other 
(extra-economic) value orientations lose their balancing 
influence, lead to increasing deviance, especially in con-
junction with anomie as described by Messner and Rosen-
feld (Savolainen 2000, Piquero and Piquero 1998). Because 
economic institutions play a central role in the trans-
formation from communist to capitalist societies, Stamatel 
(2009, 1427) agrees with Kim and Pridemore (2005) that 
the practical relevance of other social institutions, espe-
cially the political system, will decline. This reduces their 
social control function. IAT suggests that dominance of the 
economy in the transformation societies may erode other 
institutions (already weakened by the rapid speed of 
change) even more strongly than in the established capital-
ist societies. In line with this assumption, Kim and Pride-
more (2005) find in Russia no moderating effect of 
extra-economic social institutions in the relationship be-
tween negative socio-economic transformation and property 
crime. In relation to the United States, by contrast, Cham-
lin and Cochran (1995), and later Piquero and Piquero 
(1998), are able to show that extra-economic institutions 
mitigate the effects of economic deprivation on property 
crime. Thus in Russia at least, the social control function of 
extra-economic institutions appears to be weakened.
In the following we investigate data from the ESS (Euro-
pean Social Survey) and the ILO (International Labor Or-
ganization) to see if there is any evidence to back up these 
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suppositions. Is the weakening of extra-economic in-
stitutions and dominance of the economy more prominent 
in the investigated transitional societies than in Germany?
4. Economy, Political System, and Cultural Orientations in Germany and 
Eastern Europe
We wish to compare three central areas with reference to 
IAT: the economy, the political system, and cultural orien-
tations.2 Following our description above, IAT, applied to 
the Eastern European context, clearly implies differences 
between Germany and the transformation societies for the 
selected indicators of institutional structure (political sys-
tem and economy) and cultural orientations, which will be 
empirically assessed below. While this certainly does not 
mean that we can prove institutional anomie to exist in 
Eastern Europe, the investigation might give us an indi-
cation as to the validity of central tenets of IAT with refer-
ence to the transforming societies.
After a brief description of the available indicators for 
economy and the political system, we will devote our main 
attention to the country-specific cultural orientations. 
Theoretically, these represent the main point of connection 
to the adolescent attitudes and motivations on which our 
empirical analysis focus.
In countries where the economy dominates other institutions, 
according to Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008), well-being is 
extremely dependent on the forces of the market. Low rates 
of welfare spending can be interpreted as an indicator of pro-
nounced commodification (commercialization of all areas of 
society, see Polanyi 1957; Esping-Anderson 1990) and thus 
economic dominance (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008, 37; 
Messner and Rosenfeld 1997b, 1396 ff.; for a critical take on 
this see Hirtenlehner et al. 2010). Two useful measures of a 
country’s level of social spending relative to GDP are the 
ILO’s Total Social Expenditure Index (TSEI) and the Net 
Total Social Expenditure Index, which is based on the Social 
Expenditure Database (SOCX, see Adema and Ladaique 
2009) and takes into account the country-specific taxation 
systems and private welfare spending (see Figure 1).
2 The indicators were also compared between the 
former East and West Germany. With the exception of 
the indicators for the strength of the political institu-
tions (“trust in country’s parliament,” “trust in the 
legal system,” “trust in politicians,” “trust in political 
parties,” and “satisfaction with democracy”), no dif-
ferences were found between former East and West 
Germany. This could be due to the fact that East Ger-
many imported its institutional framework from West 
Germany after the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe. For more detailed results please contact the 
authors.
3 Respondents were asked about their feeling 
about the household’s income, answering 1 “living 
comfortably on present income,” 2 “coping on pre-
sent income,” 3 “difficult on present income,” or 4 
“very difficult on present income.” The variable was 
dichotomized, and Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
respondents answering with 3 or 4.
Figure 1: Commodification/decommodification
Sources: Data from ILO and ESS.
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In line with the expectations derived from IAT, both 
measures clearly indicate the highest social spending in 
Germany.
Another indicator of the balance between economic in-
stitutions and the political system in the various countries is 
the percentage of respondents in the ESS who report dif-
ficulty making ends meet in relation to TSEI.3 Altogether, Fig-
ure 1 plainly shows that social policy in the transformation 
countries is less orientated on much greater existing needs 
than in Germany. This is, we believe, associated with elevated 
commodification of labor (increased market dependency, see 
Messner and Rosenfeld 1997b). In line with IAT, we interpret 
this as a pointer to an institutional imbalance between the 
economy and the political system in the transitional societies.
According to Messner and Rosenfeld, one of the central tasks 
of the political system is to guarantee public safety. The judici-
ary and police as components within the set of political in-
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stitutions bear the main responsibility for crime control and 
peaceful conflict resolution (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994, 72 
ff.). IAT, applied to the transitional societies, implies greater 
trust in the political institutions in Germany in comparison to 
the transformation societies. The results of our country com-
parison of trust in parliament, the legal system, and the police 
are consistent with these expectations (see Figure 2).4
The lower overall levels of trust in the political systems in 
the transitional societies points to their weakened social 
control in relation to people’s activities, in comparison to 
Germany, as implied by IAT. The country-specific figures 
for satisfaction with democracy, the importance of politics, 
and how often people discuss politics (Figure 4), underline 
our supposition.6
Figure 2: Trust in institutions
Trust in parliament (F=65.5, p<0.001), the legal system (F=313.5, p<0.001), and the police 
(F=292.6, p<0.001).
A similar if less drastic pattern is found for trust in politi-
cians and political parties (Figure 3).5
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Trust in country’s
parliament
Trust in legal
system
Trust in the
police
DE
CZ
SI
PL
RU
Figure 3: Trust in politics
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Trust in politicians (F=48.0, p<0.001) and political parties (F=100.9, p<0.001).
4 Respondents were asked how much trust they 
have in the country’s parliament, in the legal system 
and in the police (0 “no trust at all” to 10 “complete 
trust”). The exceptionally large differences in trust in 
the police and the legal system between Germany and 
Eastern Europe might play a major role for the differ-
ent levels of approval of violence among adolescents
5 Respondents were asked how much trust they 
have in the country’s politicians and political parties 
(0 “no trust at all” to 10 “complete trust”).
6 Respondents were asked how satisfied they were 
with the way democracy works in their country (0 “ex-
tremely dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely satisfied”), how 
important politics is in their life (0 “extremely unim-
portant” to 10 “extremely important”) and how often 
they discuss politics/current affairs (recoded for Figure 
3: 1 “every day,” 2 “several times a week,” 3 “once a 
week,” 4 “once a month,” 5 “less often,” 6 “never”).
Figure 4: Personal relationship to politics
Importance (F=254.5, p<0.001) and frequency of discussion (F=130.7, p<0.001) of politics, sa-
tisfaction with democracy (F=141.1, p<0.001)
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Altogether this strengthens Thome’s thesis (2003) that 
democratic institutions in transformation societies suffer 
major difficulties adapting to the speed of change of the 
economic system. The political system, or polity 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 1994, 73), appears to play a 
more important role in everyday life in Germany than in 
the transformation societies. We interpret this as an indi-
cation that polity exerts greater social control in Ger-
many than in the transition societies (as this would be 
expected to protect from institutional anomie as de-
scribed by IAT).
The indicators described above give pointers to country-
specific imbalances between the economy and the political 
system. We assume, on the basis of IAT, that the cultural 
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transformations,7 which are theoretically particularly rel-
evant in relation to our target group and its attitudes since 
they possibly create a social climate that especially encour-
ages instrumentally motivated violence, are closely related 
to economic and political transformations.8
As already mentioned, according to Messner and Rosenfeld 
(1994) the weakened cultural system of an anomic society 
is recognized above all in value orientations, which become 
increasingly orientated on economic principles: success, 
egotistical individualism, and money fetishism (see above).
The ESS country comparison of internationally comparable 
measured value orientations after Schwartz (2006) (ESS 
round 1 [2002] and 4 [2008] with Russia) supplies indica -
tions that economically shaped value orientations are more 
likely to be found in the transitional societies (Figure 5).9
In line with IAT, with the exception of success orientation, 
where Germany has only the second-lowest value, all the 
other indicators point to a more strongly anomic culture in 
the transitional societies. Thus in 2008 Germans placed sig-
nificantly less importance than Poles or Russians on being 
rich and owning wealth.10 At the same time, Germans see 
themselves most strongly as people for whom it is import-
ant to be loyal and open to friends (shown in Figure 5 as 
individualism, where high values indicate weak loyalty and 
lack of openness). Germans also significantly most fre-
quently report helping other people outside their work. We 
interpret this as an indication of a more strongly dis-
integrative individualism (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 
2008) in the transformation societies. This impression is 
reinforced by the country comparison of trust, fairness, 
and helpfulness (Figure 6).11
7 Here we can admittedly represent “ transforma -
tion” empirically only as momentary snapshots of a 
pro cess.
8 But this does not represent the empirical core, 
especially as it also touches on micro/macro issues 
that are not the subject of the empirical analysis.
9 Schwartz’s value measurement: Respondents 
were asked: “Now I will briefly describe some 
people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you” (re-
coded in Figure 5: 1 “Very much like me” to 6 “not 
like me at all”): Money fetishism: “It is important to 
him/her to be rich. He/she wants to have a lot of 
money and expansive things”; success orientation: 
“being very successful is important to her/him. She/
he hopes that people will recognise her/his achiev-
ements”; egotistic individualism (not recoded in 
Figure 5): “It is important to her/him to be loyal to 
her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/him-
self to people close to her/him”; Help others (not in 
the Schwartz format): “How often do you help 
others, not counting work/voluntary organisations?” 
(recoded in Figure 5: 1 “every day,” 2 “several times 
a week,” 3 “once a week,” 4 “several times a month,” 
5 “once a month,” 6 “less often,” 7 “never”).
10 Effect sizes are calculated as quotient of mean 
difference and total standard deviation. Effect sizes 
greater than 0.2 are significant (0.2 is small, 0.5 
moderate, 0.8 large) (Nachtigall and Wirtz 1998); ef-
fect sizes of money fetish in pairwise country com-
parisons: DE/PL: d=0.34; DE/RU: d=0.67; in com-
parison with Slovenia we find a similar trend, but 
the effect strength is smaller: DE/SI: d=0.1
11 Respondents were asked whether most people in 
their country can be trusted, or you can’t be too 
care ful (0 “you can’t be too careful” to 10 “most 
people can be trusted”), whether most people try to 
take advantage of you, or try to be fair (0 “most 
people try to take advantage of me” to 10 “most 
people try to be fair”), and whether most of the time 
people are helpful or mostly looking out for them-
selves (0 “people most ly look out for themselves” to 
10 “people mostly try to be helpful”).
Figure 5: Value orientations
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Success orientation (F=82.2, p<0.001), money fetishism (F=103.3, p<0.001), helpfulness 
(F=327.6, p<0.001), and individualism (F=117.9, p<0.001).
Figure 6: Trust, fairness, and helpfulness
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Perception of trust (F=58.4, p<0.001), fairness (F=135.9, p<0.001) and helpfulness (F=219.1, p<0.001)
Note: Pairwise effect sizes indicate significant differences (see footnote 12).
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 304 – 324
Groß and Haußmann: Eastern European Transformation and Youth Attitudes 311
People in Germany plainly perceive considerably stronger 
reciprocal trust, solidarity, and helpfulness in their sur-
roundings than people in Eastern European countries.12
The figures can be interpreted as an indication of the cul-
tural consequences of economic institutional dominance as 
described by Messner and Rosenfeld. Specifically, we mean 
a strengthened “by any means necessary” mentality in the 
transition societies (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994, 17).
It is noteworthy that Slovenia appears to represent an excep -
tion among the countries that have undergone system 
change. In many of the aforementioned indices Slovenia is 
more similar to Germany than to the other countries. This 
might reflect the conspicuously successful democratic trans-
formation and the relatively stable consolidation of democ-
racy after secession from Yugoslavia (Tos and Miheljak 2002).
Altogether, however, the described data tend to strengthen 
our theoretical expectations in relation to institutional 
anomie and its cultural repercussions in the transitional 
societies, since the results of the country comparisons of 
the selected indicators are largely consistent with the re-
spective expectations as implied by IAT.
The analyses that follow below serve to investigate our IAT-
led assumption that this overall social climate has an in-
fluence on adolescent approval of violence in major cities in 
these countries. The economic dominance fostered by the 
shift to capitalism (section 3) and the corresponding value 
orientations produce, we propose, a social climate that 
fosters instrumentally motivated violence in particular. This, 
following the arguments implicit to IAT, should be reflected 
in stronger approval of instrumental violence among ado-
lescents in Eastern European cities than in Germany. In a 
nutshell, IAT, applied to the Eastern European context, sug-
gests there should be a distinct instrumental/utilitarian di-
mension underlying the motives for violence among 
youths, whereby this motive should be more prevalent in 
transitional societies than in Germany. Nonetheless it must 
be acknowledged that on the basis of the available data we 
are unable to directly establish the assumed linkages in 
terms of assessing the direct correlation between economic 
value orientations such as disintegrative individualism and 
approval of violence in the specific countries. Based on our 
data, we can only assess indications that point to the valid-
ity of the arguments implied by IAT. To do so, we concen-
trate, as already mentioned, on a cross-national comparison 
of the motivations behind the approval of violence.
5. City Comparison of Adolescent Approval of Violence
A critical appraisal of the official data reveals the relevance 
of measuring attitudes to violence in addition to using offi-
cial data on violent crime for international comparative 
studies. The suitability of official crime statistics for com-
paring violent crime internationally is very limited, as they 
include only offenses that are reported and recorded. So 
they are strongly dependent on victims’ willingness to re-
port and on police recording methods (Enzmann and Sieg-
munt 2005). In Eastern Europe the validity of official crime 
statistics is especially uncertain. In times of political, in-
stitutional, and economic upheaval there can be little con-
fidence in the reliability and continuity of police and court 
recording systems (Sack 1997). Attitudes that precede actual 
acts of violence (and especially their official registration) 
become highly relevant in this context if one wishes to con-
duct international comparisons of the phenomenon.
But the question of international comparability is also a 
central methodological problem of attitude surveys. Studies 
centring around attitude measures across different cultural 
contexts often ignore this issue of comparability of the 
measured dependent latent construct (e.g. Zhao and Cao 
2010). This can turn out to be an essential problem, for ex-
ample when the dimensionality and factor loadings of the 
measurement instrument are not equal across the different 
cultural contexts. In that case, interpretations of different 
levels of the latent construct or of relevant covariates across 
nations are at risk of being invalid, since apples and oranges 
cannot be compared (non-comparative meanings of the 
12 Pairwise calculations of effect sizes for the over-
all index (factor analysis yielded a one-factor sol-
ution, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77 in 2002/0.78 in 
2008) suggest major differences between Germany 
and the transition countries (DE/CZ: d=0.34; DE/SI: 
d=0.39; DE/PL: d=0.64; DE/RU: d=0.51); data from 
2008 used to measure effect size for Russia because 
comparable data were not available for 2002.
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dependent latent constructs). When working with latent 
constructs in a cross-cultural setting, the comparability of 
the measured latent construct needs to be assessed by test-
ing for cross-cultural invariance of dimensionality, factor 
loadings (measurement invariance), and intercepts (scalar 
invariance) of the measurement. This can be achieved by 
conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), based on 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in a multi-group setting 
(see Reinecke 2005; Brown 2006). For our cross-cultural 
analysis of youth attitudes toward violence, especially with 
respect to our in-depth interest in different comparable 
motives (dimensions) behind the measured items, the 
aforementioned problem applies acutely.
We therefore begin with an examination of the applied ap-
proval of violence scale, to investigate the dimensionality of 
the measurement in the different countries exploratively 
using principal component analysis (section 5.1.1.). We 
then extract a reduced measuring instrument for approval 
of violence through CFA following the criterion of partial 
measurement invariance (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 
1998) (section 5.1.2.). Only under this precondition of 
comparability and cross-cultural interpretability can we in 
the last step (section 5.2.) investigate the approval of viol-
ence across the different countries with a view to assessing 
the validity of our IAT-led hypotheses that there is a dis-
tinct instrumental/utilitarian dimension underlying the 
motives for violence among youths, and that this motive 
should be more prevalent in transitional societies than in 
Germany.
5.1. The City-specific Dimensionality of the Violence Attitude Scale – 
 Assessing Comparability and Cross-Cultural Interpretability of the Latent 
Dependent Variable
5.1.1 Sample and Explorative Analysis
Our analysis is based on a data set from the Criminologi-
cal Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN), produced 
by comparable school student surveys in five major cities 
(Table 1). The central components of the questionnaire 
developed by KFN were the same in all the cities (first 
wave 1998: Wetzels et al. 2001). It contains items on at-
titudes to and experience of violence from the perpetrator 
and victim perspectives as well as indicators on social 
status, primary socialization (such as childhood experi-
ence of violence or positive parental attention), norm 
orientations of adults and peers, attitude to violence-
legitimizing masculinity norms, and personality char-
acteristics such as self-control.
Random samples of ninth-grade school classes stratified 
by school type were surveyed in 1998, 1999, and 2000 in 
Kraków, Volgograd, Ljubljana, and Hamburg. In Plzen a 
total survey of all school students in ninth grade was con-
ducted. The sample sizes in the individual cities are shown 
in Table 1. Overall response rates ranged between 80 and 
90 percent.
Table 1: The sample
Sample 
(total: 
N=9905)
Gender
Age  
(Average)
Education
Ljubljana 
19.5% 
N=1934
Male: 
46.5% 
(N=899)  
Female: 
53.5% 
(N=1035)
15.03 
(S.D.=.80)
high: 17.4% 
middle: 
40.2%  
low: 42.4%
Hamburg 
34.7% 
N=3435
Male: 
48.7% 
(N=1672)  
Female:  
51.2% 
(N=1758)
15.11 
(S.D.=.72)
high: 38.4%  
middle:  
51.6%  
low: 10%
Volgograd  
17.6% 
N=1747
Male: 
45.3% 
(N=791)  
Female: 
54.7% 
(N=955)
14.56 
(S.D.=.53)
high: 20.9%  
middle:  
12.3%  
low: 66.8%
Plzen  
12.8% 
N=1270
Male: 
45.4% 
(N=573)  
Female: 
54.6% 
(N=690)
15.03 
(S.D.=.47)
high: 5.5%  
middle: 
12.3%  
low: 82.2%
Kraków  
15.3% 
N=1519
Male: 
51.9% 
(N=784)  
Female: 
48.1% 
(N=726)
15.5 
(S.D.=.9)
high: 33.7%  
middle: 
16.3%  
low: 50%
When we refer in the following to German, Russian, Slove-
nian, Polish, or Czech adolescents we are referring not to 
nationally representative samples but to representative 
samples of adolescents from the respective cities.
The original scale for measuring approval of violence com-
prises fifteen statements to which respondents were asked 
to indicate their agreement or disagreement on a four-
point scale (1 for “completely disagree” to 4 for “fully 
agree”). Because certain items were omitted from the sur-
vey in particular countries, we concentrated only on the 
ten items that were included in the questionnaires in all the 
countries (for items see Appendix 1). As Table 2 shows, the 
data from the individual samples produce very different 
factor solutions.
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Table 2: Sample-specific factorial structure country-specific structures of approval of violence found 
among the adolescents using EFA. Only under this precon-
dition can possible comparable dimensions (motives) be 
validly interpreted across cultural contexts and sub-
sequently cross-country comparative investigations of the 
extent of approval of violence be conducted.
First, on the basis of the EFA, we conducted separate CFAs 
for the three different models identified in each of the 
countries (for country-specific models see Appendix 3). We 
then identified a two-factor structure which fits the data 
best in all cities. Despite it being partly identified in the ex-
plorative context, the single-factor structure turned out to 
be the worst in all the countries in the confirmatory context 
(see Appendix 3). Based on the two-factor structure with 
the best model fits, we conducted a multi-group com-
parison to test for measurement and scalar invariance 
(equal factor loadings and intercepts of the indicator vari-
ables) across the cities, which is a precondition for cross-
national mean comparisons.
Altogether across the countries the overall scale exhibits 
neither scale nor measurement invariance. The criterion of 
partial measurement invariance (Steenkamp and Baum-
gartner 1998), under which there must be at least two in-
variant factor loadings and intercepts across the groups in 
order to be able to conduct mean comparisons, is not fulfil-
led by the scale across the five countries either. The same is 
confirmed by pairwise country comparison of the in-
strument. Taken together, these findings mean that al-
though the surveyed items adequately map two latent 
dimensions of violence motivation (in the CFA we could 
identify one two-factor structure with good fit indices in all 
five cities), the meanings of these items for these dimen-
sions are not comparable.
Because this lack of comparability precludes conducting 
cross-national analyses of violence motivation using the 
overall scale analysed here, we proceeded to extract a re-
duced measuring model with invariant factor loadings 
that is generalizable across the countries (Figure 7). Be-
cause items 1, 4, and 9 have strong shared influencing fac-
tors in all the countries (error correlations), we tested 
these as the reduced factor of the first motive of approval 
Ljubljana
Hamburg
Volgograd
Plzen
Kraków
Factorial  
structure
2 
(Item 5  excluded)
1
2 
(Item 10 excluded)
1
1 
(Item 5 excluded)
Cronbach’s α
Subscale 1: .80 
Subscale 2: .64 
Overall: .81
.88
Subscale 1: .72  
Subscale 2: .68  
Overall: .76
.89
.89
Explained  
variance
53.6%  
[Factor 1: 41.6%]
51.4%
48.7 % 
[Factor 1: 35.4%]
48.9%
53.8%
Factor  
correlation
.467
–
.333
–
–
Ljubljana and Volgograd each exhibit a different two-factor 
structure, while our explorative factor analysis with Kaiser 
criterion (eigenvalue > 1 for a separate factor) found a 
single-factor structure in Hamburg, Kraków, and Plzen (for 
detailed descriptions of the two-factor solutions see Appen -
dix 2). The factor loading for Item 5 (“If somebody attacks 
me then I hit back,” defensive motive) in Ljubljana and Kra-
ków was too low, so it had to be excluded from the final fac-
tor solution. The same problem arose in Volgograd for Item 
10 (“If someone provokes me I quickly turn to violence”).
In her analysis of the very same instrument in Russia, Sieg-
munt (2005) found exactly the same factor structure as we 
found in Volgograd. She designated the two factors “will-
ingness to commit instrumental violence” and “willingness 
to commit violence for fun.” However, because explorative 
analyses suggest that the measurements are not comparable 
across our five samples we must for the moment desist from 
naming and interpreting the dimensions, which we refer to 
as motives in the following. Because comparability of the 
dependent variables is essential for our investigation and for 
valid interpretations of the dimensions, confirmatory ana-
lyses follow. The objective is to extract a comparable 
measuring instrument.
5.1.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Dependent Variables in Multi-
group Comparison
The following analyses set out to identify a reduced model 
measuring comparable latent constructs (attitudes toward 
violence) across all the countries despite the different 
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of violence. The second motive is formed from items 12, 
13, and 14, following the structure in Ljubljana that fits 
the data best in all cities apart from Volgograd (see Ap-
pendix 3). These three items are also contained in the in-
strumental motive in Volgograd (Siegmunt 2005) and 
exhibit good loadings.
Table 3:  Reduced model of approval of violence, multi-group comparison
Figure 7: Reduced model of approval of violence (simplified depiction)
If you are going to have fun there just
has to be a bit of violence involved (Item 1)
You have to resort to violence because it’s
the only way to get noticed (Item 4)
Without violence everything would
be much more boring (Item 9)
The young use violence to sort things out,
adults just talk (Item 12)
It is perfecty normal for men to want to prove
themselves by fighting with others (Item 13)
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,
that’s how life is (Item 14)
Motive 1
(all cities)
Motive 2
(all cities)
For the reduced measuring model of approval of violence 
we can assume partial measurement invariance across all 
countries if only two factor loadings per factor are fixed ac-
ross the groups (Table 3, Model 2).13 This model does not 
fit the data significantly worse than the baseline model 
(Model 1) in which all factor loadings can be freely esti-
mated in the countries (apart from the marker). There are 
no longer any relevant error correlations between the 
items. The scale can thus be regarded as measuring com-
parables in all the investigated countries. Across the coun-
tries the items have a comparable meaning for the latent 
dimensions (motives).
..
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
χ² (df)
269.496 (40)
295.500 (48)
1520.015 (64)
500.402 (53)
Δ χ²
compared to 
model 1: 26.0  
(8)
compared to 
model 2: 1224.52 
(16)
compared to 
model 2: 204.902 
(5)
p
n.s.
<0.001
<0.001
RMSEA/SRMR
0.055/0.025
0.052/0.029
0.110/0.065
0.067/0.034
CFI
0.986
0.984
0.909
0.972
Model 1: Baseline
Model 2: Partial measurement invariance (dimension 1: factor loading 1, 4 invariant; dimension 
2: factor loading 12, 14 invariant), no mean structure.
Model 3: Partial measurement invariance (dimension 1: factor loading 1, 4 invariant; dimension 
2: factor loading 12, 14 invariant) + all intercepts invariant (mean structure).
Model 4: Partial measurement invariance (dimension 1: factor loading 1, 4 invariant; dimension 
2: factor loading 12, 14 invariant) + intercepts 1, 4 and 12, 14 invariant + additional release of 
intercept restriction for Hamburg, Plzen Item 12, Kraków Item 01.
On the other hand, scale invariance (mean comparisons 
permitted) cannot be assumed, because the model (Model 
3) clearly and significantly worsens when the intercepts of 
the items are fixed across the countries. The comparative fit 
index (CFI) of 0.909 is no longer acceptable (for a good 
model fit values should be higher than .93). According to 
Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), however, a com-
parison of means is also permissible when only the inter-
cepts of the two invariant factor loadings are additionally 
invariant. Despite minimal releases of these restrictions, 
Model 4 fulfils this condition adequately given the many 
groups. Although it remains worse than the case without 
invariance of intercepts after the χ² difference test, it has in 
itself a very good CFI (0.972); RMSEA (0.067 [0.062; 
0.072]) and SRMR (0.034) are also acceptable. Thus this 
model is used in the following analyses as the cross-
country measurement of approval of violence.
We believe that the cross-city comparable two-factor sol-
ution provides two dimensions that can be meaningfully 
13 In order to account for possible distortions in 
the results through deviations from normal distribu-
tion, we also calculated the model with the MLR es-
timation with robust standard errors (an estimation 
method based on maximum likelihood that is more 
robust against deviations from normal-distribution 
of the variables). The Scaling Correction Factor was 
1.25 and there were no noteworthy deviations of the 
coefficients from the ML estimators (estimated by 
maximum likelihood estimation). We therefore 
chose the ML estimation in order to be able to con-
duct and interpret Chi-square difference tests.
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interpreted in the scope of IAT. With regard to the respec-
tive motives for violence, it would appear to make sense to 
distinguish the factors into approval of violence for in-
strumental/utilitarian reasons (motive 2), and hedonistic 
approval of violence (motive 1).
We believe motive 2 to contain clearly purpose-driven ideas 
about when the use of violence is necessary or permitted, 
thus making it an instrumental/utilitarian motive in a 
broader sense. At the same time, it is not a “pure” in-
strumental motive aiming at monetary success, as would be 
most clearly defined in the scope of IAT. It is rather 
“mixed” in the sense of containing aspects of the former 
collectivist culture, for example in terms of values of honor. 
Honor in turn may be a compensatory substitution for 
monetary success offered by collectivistic elements of cul-
tural tradition. Overall, motive 2 clearly contains a stronger 
instrumental/utilitarian element than motive 1, which has a 
more pronounced hedonistic element. Motive 1 relates 
more to individual and personal gratification, recreation/
entertainment, and fun in connection with violence, in 
contrast to the rather collectively pronounced motive 2, as 
clearly reflected in the three items of motive 1. Alongside 
Items 1 and 9, which intelligibly elucidate a fun dimension, 
the purpose of getting noticed (Item 4) is in our view for 
adolescents, possibly unlike adults, another facet of indi-
vidual-centered fun and recreation. Since IAT is suggestive 
of a distinct instrumental/utilitarian dimension implicit in 
the motivations for violence which does not need to be ex-
clusively aimed at profit in the narrow sense, but can also 
aim at prestige (see section 2), our findings are so far gen-
erally consistent with the expected dimensionality.
From there, we go on to analyze whether there is any vari-
ation in the levels of the different motives for violence be-
tween the transitional societies and Germany. IAT, applied to 
the Eastern European context (see section 3), suggests that 
especially the instrumental/utilitarian motive should be more 
prevalent in the transitional societies, since the instrumental/
utilitarian motive more clearly represents a facet in which vi-
olence is approved as a means to achieve a useful objective 
(e.g., honor as a compensatory substitute for monetary suc-
cess). The question of more or less morally controlled means 
to achieve a culturally prescribed and useful goal is, following 
Merton (1938), also a central point in IAT (Messner and Ro-
senfeld 1994, 84; Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008, 32).
5.2. Description and Discussion of Findings
First we tested whether the cultural institutional context in 
the Eastern European transformation societies had any in-
fluence at all on the extent of approval of violence and 
whether this influence differed in relation to the two dif-
ferent motive structures (Figure 8).
Building on Zhao and Cao, whose analysis operationalizes 
“rapid sociopolitical change” (2010, 1215) in the form of a 
dummy variable named “nations of Eastern Europe under 
democratic transition,” we also grouped the investigated 
Eastern European countries (value 1) as a dummy variable 
with reference category Germany (value 0). Following Zhao 
and Cao (2010) we assume that the nations of Eastern Europe 
have experienced a unique, extremely rapid, shared devel-
opment trajectory. This makes them of interest for studies of 
cultural contexts as a group contrasted against other nations, 
especially long-established capitalist democracies (such as 
Germany). The contrast is especially relevant in the context of 
IAT (see section 3). As already mentioned, our method 
merely captures a snapshot of the transformation process.
Figure 8: Motives for violence regressed on Eastern European trans-
formation; CFI=0.955/RMSEA=0.079/SRMR=0.035
Item 1
Item 4
Item 9
Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
Hedonistic motivation
for violence
Instrumental/utilitarian
motivation for violence
Eastern Europe
transformation
-13.***
.28***
Note: y-standardized regression coefficients because the independent variable is a dummy va-
riable. MLR estimation tested (robust standard errors), scaling correction factor = 1.1.
The results shown in Figure 8 affirm the inferences drawn 
from the factor analysis, support a key hypothesis and open 
up an unexpected line of inquiry. First, the opposite effects 
on the two motive structures mean that the measuring in-
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strument may on no account be treated and interpreted as a 
one-dimensional construct across the contexts. Second, in 
line with our specific assumption on the differing extent of 
approval of violence in Germany and in the transition so-
cieties, the context of Eastern Europe fosters the formation 
of an instrumental/utilitarian violence motivation among 
adolescents (β=.28***). This result is consistent with the 
expectedly higher prevalence of that motive in the Eastern 
European context as implied by IAT. But we also found an 
unexpected negative effect of the transformation on the he-
donistic motive structure (β= -.13***), telling us that the 
hedonistic motive is on a lower level in the transitional so-
cieties, which requires further explanation.
IAT offers no clear explanation for this. From this per-
spective it would be just as conceivable that an egotistical 
and hedonistic variant of approval of violence would ac-
tually, alongside the key dimension of the instrumental/
utilitarian motive, also be more prevalent in the transitional 
societies because the moral influence of extra-economic in-
stitutions loses its practical relevance for individuals.
To validate our findings, we further tested the “Eastern ef-
fect” (Figure 11) with the regional dummies (see Appendix 
4). First, all city dummies have a significant positive effect 
on the instrumental/utilitarian motive, bolstering our IAT-
led hypothesis. Second, the negative Eastern effect on the 
hedonistic motive is mainly driven by Ljubljana and Vol-
gograd. In Krakow, both, the instrumental motive and the 
hedonistic motive are more prevalent than in Hamburg. 
This, alongside the fact that Slovenia, which, following our 
indicators for institutional anomie, was half-way between 
Germany and the other Eastern countries, makes the sec-
ond strongest contribution to the Eastern effect, indicates 
that there is no single explanation for the variance of viol-
ence motivation between the countries, but that the mech-
anisms involved are more complex.
In the next step, to further explain this “Eastern effect,” we 
must leave the narrow path of IAT with respect to the avail-
able data. Based on our data, we cannot go down the line of 
establishing the assumed linkage between the two motives 
and economic dominance or disintegrative individualism, 
as indicated by IAT. Doing so would empirically shed light 
upon the question whether the instrumental/utilitarian 
motive is a more prominent consequence of economically 
informed value orientations among adolescents than the 
hedonistic motive, and whether this could explain away the 
greater levels of the instrumental/utilitarian motive in the 
transitional societies.
Based on the available data, we alternatively analyzed the 
possibility that the “Eastern effect” could be explained with 
reference to different levels of deprivation in Eastern Eu-
rope and Germany,14 with deprivation being another 
prominent explanans for deviance and violence (Bernburg 
2002; Savolainen 2000; Chamblin and Cochran 1995; Mer-
ton 1938). The analysis indicates that this is not the case 
(Appendix 5: Models1 and 2).
In the next step we tried to get closer to the mechanisms 
that lead to the “Eastern effect” by additionally taking into 
account effects of socialization such as child-rearing prac-
tices in the family, current parental norm orientations, cur-
rent family climate, and exposure to delinquent peer 
groups (see Appendix 5: Models 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7).
Close consideration of the respective effects of the different 
covariates on the two motives, net the “Eastern effect” (Ap-
pendix 5), hints at an interesting pattern. First, similar to 
the “Eastern effect,” deprivation tends to have a negative ef-
fect on the hedonistic motive, while it tends to have a 
slightly positive or no effect on the instrumental/utilitarian 
motive. Second, early child-rearing practices in the family 
(experience of parental violence during childhood before 
the age of twelve, positive parental attention in childhood) 
tend to have stronger explanatory power for the hedonistic 
motive for violence than for the instrumental/utilitarian 
motive (see Appendix 5: Model 7). Third, the current 
family climate (within the last twelve months) and parental 
14 The coefficient of deprivation regressed on 
transformation is highly significant (0.72***), indi-
cating that in our data, deprivation is more preva-
lent among the adolescent respondents from Eastern 
Europe than among those from Germany.
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norm orientations seem to have a stronger influence on the 
emergence of the instrumental/utilitarian violence moti-
vation of adolescents than on their hedonistic motivation 
(see Appendix 5: Model 7). Fourth, exposure to delinquent 
peer groups yields similarly strong effects on both motives 
for violence, though a little stronger on the hedonistic mo-
tive (see Appendix 5: Model 7).
The “Eastern effect” on the two motives keeps changing 
slightly when taking into account the above mentioned co-
variates step by step and thereby bolsters the possibility of a 
more complex mechanism that fosters youth motivations 
for violence. Overall, the “Eastern effect” on the hedonistic 
motive tends to get stronger, whereas the effect on the in-
strumental/utilitarian motive tends to get weaker, especially 
after taking into account the current norm orientations 
against violence of the parents and the current family cli-
mate in terms of inconsistent prohibitions (see Appendix 5: 
Models 4 to 6). This means that the present traits of the 
parental home seem to play a role with regard to the “East-
ern effect” on the instrumental/utilitarian motive. The re-
sults hint at the possibility of a mediating function of the 
family in the relationship between Eastern European trans-
formation and instrumental/utilitarian motivation for vi-
olence, since the direct effect of transformation on the 
instrumental/utilitarian motive clearly shrinks after taking 
into account the above mentioned current aspects of the 
family. At the same time, current parental normative rejec-
tion of violence and inconsistent family climate are sig-
nificantly related to transformation (β=-0.27*** and 
β=0.29*** respectively). A city-specific validation of this ef-
fect confirms our assumptions without exception. After 
taking into account the current aspects of the family, the 
Eastern city effects on the instrumental/utilitarian motive 
shrink in all city-specific analyses. At the same time, the 
possible mediators for this Eastern effect on the in-
strumental/utilitarian motive are significantly correlated 
with the respective city dummies as expected, with one 
single non-significant exception in Krakow (see Appendix 
6). The strong Eastern effect in Ljubljana, which, following 
our IAT-led rationale in combination with the results re-
garding the indicators for institutional anomie, should be 
the weakest, might be explained by the mediating function 
of the current family. One of the possible mediators in the 
Eastern effect on the instrumental/utilitarian motive, in-
consistent prohibitions, is significantly more prevalent in 
Ljubljana than in Hamburg or any of the other cities. This 
could be one explanation for the strong Eastern effect in 
Ljubljana.
Our results suggest that further research taking into ac-
count indirect effects via socialization provided by non-
economic institutions (e.g., child-rearing practices in the 
family) is likely to be worthwhile.
It remains the case that the overall “Eastern effect” on the 
two motives for violence of the adolescent respondents 
turns out to be considerably stable, independent from de-
privation, early child rearing practices in the family, cur-
rent norm orientations against violence of the parents, the 
current family climate, exposure to delinquent peer 
groups, age, and education.15 The instrumental/utilitarian 
motive for violence among the adolescent respondents is 
more prevalent in the transition societies, whereas the he-
donistic motive is more prevalent among the German re-
spondents.
Using our data we were only able to scrape the surface of 
the background reasons behind differences in motives for 
violence. Alongside a detailed exploration of the mech-
anisms, as mentioned above, we think that further em-
pirical assessments with regard to a validation of the 
opposite effects of the Eastern European context on the 
two different motives for violence in an adult sample could 
be worthwhile. This would shed light on the question, 
whether the “Eastern effect” in our data is due to the spe-
cific lifeworlds of adolescents (e.g. hallmarked by specific 
youth cultures or influences of socialization), or whether it 
is indeed a more general societal phenomenon in the tran-
sitional nations.
15 The Eastern effect was additionally controlled 
for age and education, but these are not shown in 
the table.
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6. Summary and Outlook
Using micro- and macro-level data we were able to 
bolster our assumption that the economy would be more 
dominant and omnipresent in the transitional societies 
than in Germany. In line with IAT, we found indications 
of an imbalance between the political system and the 
economy in the transformation societies. This was cor-
roborated by a country comparison of subjective assess-
ment of personal financial situation and of the 
relationship between social spending and GDP. Taken to-
gether these elements suggest greater commodification of 
labor in the transformation countries. At the same time 
we found evidence that the relevance and credibility of 
the political system and democratic institutions were re-
duced for the populations in the transitional societies. 
The cultural base of institutional anomie was also more 
widely visible there: the indicators implied stronger 
money fetish, disintegrative individualism, and erosion of 
solidarity in the transitional nations.
Overall, the results of the cross-national comparisons of se-
lected indicators for institutional structure and cultural 
orientations are consistent with expected differences as im-
plied by IAT, applied to the Eastern European context of 
transformation.
From there, we followed an IAT-led argumentation ex-
pecting a distinct instrumental/utilitarian dimension 
underlying the motives for violence among youths, as well 
as a greater prominence of this motive among the adoles-
cents in the transitional nations.
On the one hand, the findings are consistent with the ex-
pected dimensionality and variation across nations. Even 
though, due to a lack of sufficient data, specific assumed 
linkages as implied by IAT (e.g. between economic domi-
nance or disintegrative individualism and violence moti-
vation) could not be established, the results with regard to 
a specific instrumental/utilitarian motive for violence 
being more prevalent in the transitional societies, alongside 
the results about institutional structure and cultural orien-
tations as described above, point to the utility of applying 
insights from IAT to understanding the dynamics of viol-
ence within the Eastern European context of trans-
formation. In order to discover more about the validity of 
the underlying theoretical mechanisms we believe deeper 
studies into the country-specific connections between 
micro-level indicators of economic dominance and adoles-
cent approval of violence to be necessary. The limited na-
ture of our data precluded expanding our investigation in 
such a way.
On the other hand, the results suggest that alongside the 
instrumental/utilitarian motive there is a specific hedo-
nistic motivation for violence underlying the measurement 
in a cross-nationally comparable manner, which in turn is 
more prevalent among the German youths. The reasoning 
of IAT seems to be coherent with respect to the in-
strumental/utilitarian motive in our data, but the hedo-
nistic facet of the discovered “Eastern effect” cannot be 
clearly interpreted in the scope of IAT. Due to the afore-
mentioned lack of sufficient data to establish linkages be-
tween disintegrative individualism and the two distinct 
motives for violence, we established alternative approaches 
to the mechanisms that might explain the “Eastern effect,” 
based on the available data. Findings show that the “East-
ern effect” cannot be explained away by any of the con-
sidered covariates: deprivation, early child rearing practices 
in the family, current norm orientations of the parents, the 
current family climate, exposure to delinquent peer groups, 
age, and education.
Overall, the results of those additional analyses suggest 
that the mechanisms that lead to this stable “Eastern ef-
fect” are rather complex. Our additional findings hint at 
the possibility that the family might play a mediating role 
with regard to the “Eastern effect” on the instrumental/
utilitarian motive for violence. The results suggest that, 
alongside more detailed empirical assessments, further 
theorizing along these lines is likely to be worthwhile. 
Even within the scope of IAT, the precise mechanisms 
could be more fully theorized. For example, to what extent 
does economic dominance affect motives for youth viol-
ence indirectly via the socialization provided by non-
economic institutions (e.g., child-rearing practices in the 
family, current educational practices and norm-
orientation of the parents) rather than directly via cultu-
ral orientations (e.g., values of disintegrative 
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individualism)? For adults this specific indirect mech-
anism might be less relevant in terms of a conceivably 
stronger direct influence of general cultural orientations 
on their motives for violence, since they are usually by 
then rather independent from their parental home. 
Further theoretical and empirical assessments along these 
lines seem worthwhile to us.
As a last point we need to acknowledge the already men-
tioned limitation of our samples to major cities in the re-
spective countries, thus lacking nationally representative 
data. This means that we have only urban populations in 
our samples, and lack rural populations, which might bias 
the results with regard to entire nations. This is a potential 
limitation that needs to be addressed in future research.
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Appendix
1. Items
Item 1: If you are going to have fun there just has to be a bit of 
violence involved.
Item 4: You have to resort to violence because it’s the only way to 
get noticed.
Item 5: If somebody attacks me then I hit back.
Item 7: The strongest must win, otherwise there is no progress.
Item 8: If I have to show what I’m capable of then I use violence.
Item 9: Without violence everything would be much more boring.
Item 10: If someone provokes me I quickly turn to violence.
Item 12: The young use violence to sort things out, adults just 
talk.
Item 13: It is perfectly normal for men to want to prove them-
selves by fighting with others.
Item 14: An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, that’s how life is.
2. Explorative Factor Solutions
Table A2–1: Item and scale values for the approval of violence scale for Ljubljana
Items
If you are going to have fun there just has 
to be a bit of violence involved (item 1)
You have to resort to violence because 
it’s the only way to get noticed (Item 4)
The strongest must win, otherwise there 
is no progress (Item 7)
If I have to show what I’m capable of 
then I use violence (Item 8)
Without violence everything would be 
much more boring (Item 9)
If someone provokes me I quickly turn 
to violence (Item 10)
Motive/Factor 1
The young use violence to sort things 
out, adults just talk (Item 12)
It is perfectly normal for men to want to 
prove themselves by fighting with others 
(Item 13)
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, 
that’s how life is (Item 14)
Motive/Factor 2
Overall scale (without Item 5)
M
15.6
9.5
26.5
13.7
15.7
30.5
18.5
36.7
46.0
40.7
41.1
26.1
SD
25.42
20.69
29.35
23.70
26.16
29.79
18.39
32.21
32.69
33.91
25.19
18.06
FL
.81
.74
.60
.79
.68
.55
α =.80
.74
.86
.63
α =.64
α =.81
r
it
0.58
0.54
0.47
0.67
0.61
0.50
0.45
0.48
0.42
NL
-.13
.01
-.06
.12
.05
.18
-.09
.05
.14
Abbreviations: FL = factor loading; rit = selectivity coefficient of items; α = reliability of sub sca-
le/overall scale; AL= ancillary loading.
Table A2–2: Item and scale values for the approval of violence scale for Volgograd
Items
If somebody attacks me then I hit back 
(Item 5)
The strongest must win, otherwise there 
is no progress (Item 7)
If I have to show what I’m capable of 
then I use violence (Item 8)
The young use violence to sort things 
out, adults just talk (Item 12)
It is perfectly normal for men to want to 
prove themselves by fighting with others 
(Item 13)
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, 
that’s how life is (Item 14)
Motive/Factor 1
If you are going to have fun there just 
has to be a bit of violence involved 
(item 1)
You have to resort to violence because 
it’s the only way to get noticed (Item 4)
Without violence everything would be 
much more boring (Item 9)
Motive/Factor 2
Overall scale (without Item 10)
M
75.7
36.6
38.2
31.0
46.6
50.2
46.4
12.5
10.5
13.0
12.0
34.9
SD
25.27
33.12
32.29
33.27
32.57
33.17
20.40
23.97
21.77
23.70
18.06
17.15
FL
.65
.55
.65
.46
.68
.66
α =.72
.78
.80
.68
α =.68
α =.76
r
it
0.30
0.46
0.48
0.44
0.52
0.48
0.53
0.48
0.47
NL
–0.05
–0.05
0.25
–0.08
–0.21
–0.31
–0.05
0.01
0.14
Abbreviations: FL = factor loading; r
it
 = selectivity coefficient of items; ( = reliability of subscale/
overall scale; AL = ancillary loading.
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3. Confirmatory City-specific Structural Comparison of Measuring Instrument
Figure A3–1: Model 1, one-factor solution (Hamburg, Plzen, Kraków)
If you are going to have fun there just
has to be a bit of violence involved (Item 1)
You have to resort to violence because it’s
the only way to get noticed (Item 4)
Without violence everything would
be much more boring (Item 9)
If someone provokes me I quickly
turn to violence (Item 10)
The strongest must win, otherwise 
there is no progress (Item 7)
If I have to show what I’m capable of
then I use violence (Item 8)
The young use violence to sort things out,
adults just talk (Item 12)
It is perfectly normal for men to want to prove
themselves by fighting with others (Item 13)
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,
that’s how life is (Item 14)
Motive
(Kraków/Plzen/Hamburg)
Figure A3–2: Model 2, two-factor solution in Volgograd
If you are going to have fun there just
has to be a bit of violence involved (Item 1)
You have to resort to violence because it’s
the only way to get noticed (Item 4)
Without violence everything would
be much more boring (Item 9)
If somebody attacks me then
I hit back (Item 5)
The strongest must win, otherwise 
there is no progress (Item 7)
If I have to show what I’m capable of
then I use violence (Item 8)
The young use violence to sort things out,
adults just talk (Item 12)
It is perfectly normal for men to want to prove
themselves by fighting with others (Item 13)
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,
that’s how life is (Item 14)
Motive 1
(Volgograd)
Motive 2
(Volgograd)
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Figure A3–3: Model 3, two- factor solution in Ljubljana
If you are going to have fun there just
has to be a bit of violence involved (Item 1)
You have to resort to violence because it’s
the only way to get noticed (Item 4)
Without violence everything would
be much more boring (Item 9)
If someone provokes me I quickly
turn to violence (Item 10)
The strongest must win, otherwise 
there is no progress (Item 7)
If I have to show what I’m capable of
then I use violence (Item 8)
The young use violence to sort things out,
adults just talk (Item 12)
It is perfectly normal for men to want to prove
themselves by fighting with others (Item 13)
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,
that’s how life is (Item 14)
Motive 1
(Ljubljana)
Motive 2
(Ljubljana)
Table A3-1: 
....
Ljubljana
Hamburg
Volgograd
Kraków
Plzen
Model1  
(CFI/BIC/RMSEA/
SRMR)
0.922/148557.623
/0.081/0.045
0.961/268568.942
/0.074/0.029
0.877/142770.904
/0.093/0.051
0.973/110625.281
/0.062/0.024
0.970/100398.485
/0.063/0.029
Model 2  
(CFI/BIC/RMSEA/
SRMR)
0.917/150362.216
/0.082/0.044
0.969/269904.571
/0.064/0.026
0.943/142683.467
/0.061/0.035
0.972/112033.240
/0.060/0.028
0.974/102049.988
/0.057/0.028
Model 3  
(CFI/BIC/RMSEA/
SRMR)
0.972/148355.172
/0.050/0.027
0.979/268354.011
/0.055/0.021
0.911/142664.131
/0.080/0.045
0.982/110585.667
/0.052/0.021
0.975/100380.746
/0.058/0.026
Model 1: one-factor model without Item 5 (9 Items); Model 2: two-factor-model as found in Vol-
gograd (without Item 10); Model 3: two-factor-model asfound in Ljubljana (without Item 5). 
No error correlations permitted between indicator variables; BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion, 
lower values indicate a better fit) comparisons permitted between Model 1 and Model 3 (same 
covariance matrix).
4. Validation of the Eastern Effect with Regional Dummies
......
Ljubljana
Volgograd
Plzen
Kraków
Instrumental/utilitarian 
 motivation for violence
0.317***
0.406***
0.264***
0.106**
Hedonistic motivation for 
 violence
–0.323***
–0.423***
n.s.
0.226***
Table A4–1: Motivation for violence regressed on the specific city 
 dummies, reference category Hamburg
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5. Further Analyses Concerning Mechanisms that Could Explain the “Eastern Effect”
Table A5–1: Multivariate linear regressions to approach the mechanisms that lead to the Eastern effect
Covariat
transformation
deprivation
eltpos
eltgew
normelt
inkons
delisubk
R2 (I/H)
CFI
χ² (df)
RMSEA (pclose)
SRMR
Model 1 (I/H)
0.278***/ 
–0.132***
0.018/ 
0.004
0.955
721.123 (12)
0.079  
(0.000)
0.035
Model 2 (I/H)
0.266***/ 
–0.136***
0.12**/ 
0.038(n.s.)
0.019/ 
0.004
0.954
749.283 (16)
0.070  
(0.000)
0.032
Model 3 (I/H)
0.273***/ 
–0.127***
0.06*/ 
–0.03(n.s.)
–0.194***/ 
–0.251***
0.059/ 
0.065
0.958
2002.991 (82)
0.051  
(0.135)
0.026
Model 4 (I/H)
0.266***/ 
–0.134***
0.039(n.s.)/ 
–0.056*
–0.158***/ 
–0.198***
0.116***/ 
0.182***
0.070/ 
0.096
0.955
2863.162 (139)
0.047  
(0.999)
0.027
Model 5 (I/H)
0.208***/ 
–0.191**
0.012(n.s.)/ 
–0.086*
–0.120***/ 
–0.162***
0.096***/ 
0.168***
–0.248***/ 
–0.231***
0.128/ 
0.147
0.958
2854.425 (170)
0.043  
(1.000)
0.026
Model 6 (I/H)
0.152***/ 
–0.213***
0.013(n.s.)/ 
–0.086*
–0.065***/ 
–0.143***
0.039*/ 
0.142***
–0.251***/ 
–0.234***
0.201***/ 
0.075***
0.161/ 
0.152
0.955
3130.279 (204)
0.042  
(1.000)
0.026
Model 7 (I/H)
0.227***/ 
–0.200***
0.009(n.s.)/ 
–0.082*
–0.067***/ 
–0.147***
–0.031(n.s.)/ 
0.052**
–0.121***/ 
–0.087***
0.100***/ 
–0.036(n.s.)
0.530***/ 
0.596***
0.404/ 
0.454
0.952
2789.964 (265)
0.040  
(1.000)
0.027
transform
deprivation
childhood
current 
 parenting
peer groop
I=instrumental/utilitarian motive for violence
H = hedonistic motive for violence
eltpos=positive parental attention (childhood)
eltgew=experience of parental violence (childhood)
normelt=current parental normative rejection of violence
inkons=current family climate: inconsistent prohibitions
delisubk=delinquent, violent peer group.
Operationalization:
eltpos: Respondents were asked: “Please think of the time when you were a kid. We mean the ti-
me before you turned 12. How often did your parents behave toward you in the way it is descri-
bed below?” Respondents could answer from 1 “never” to 4 “often.” The eltpos index was calcu-
lated by the mean of the following Items (if latent, was modelled accordingly): 1. “they praised 
me when I did something especially well”; 2. “They put their arms around me and cuddled me”; 
3. “They calmed me down when I was afraid”; 4. “They explained things in a calm way to me 
when I did something wrong”; 5. “They really cared for me”; 6. “They protected me”; and 7. “They 
comforted me when I was sad.”
eltgew: Respondents were asked: “Please think of the time when you were a kid. We mean the 
time before you turned 12. How often did your parents behave toward you in the way it is descri-
bed below? ” Respondents could answer from 1 “never” to 4 “often.” The eltgew index was calcu-
lated by the mean of the following Items (if latent, modelled accordingly): 1. “They threw with 
things at me”; 2.”They gripped me hard or pushed me”; 3. “They hit me”; 4. “They hit me with an 
object.”
normelt: Respondents were asked: “Imagine, during school break, you got into a fight with so-
meone from your class. You get very angry and hit him in the face with your fist. He falls to the 
ground, his pants get ripped and his nose starts bleeding. You did not get hurt. If you did some-
thing like that: How bad would the following persons think that is? Respondents could answer 
from 1 “not bad at all” to 5 “very bad.” The normelt index takes into account the answers for fat-
her and mother (mean of the two Items; if latent, modelled accordingly).
inkons: Respondents were asked: “Please tick off, how often the following occurred at home in 
your family during the last twelve months”: Respondents could answer from 1 “never” to 5 “very 
often.” The inkons index was calculated by the mean of the following Items (if latent, modelled 
accordingly): 1. “No matter how I behaved, my parents always found it wrong”; 2. “Concerning 
prohibitions, my parents said one thing and then the other, I never really knew how to behave 
right.”
delisubk: The respondents were asked to evaluate the following statements about their group of 
friends using a four-point scale (1 for “completely untrue” to 4 for “completely true”). The deli-
subk index was calculated by the mean of the following Items (if latent, modelled accordingly): 
1. “We fight with other groups”; 2. “When we get together many people are scared of us”; 3. “To 
have fun we sometimes do things that are forbidden.”
deprivation: We constructed deprivation as a dummy variable where value 1 comprises adoles-
cents whose parents are affected by unemployment and/or receive welfare benefits.
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6. Effects of the Regional Dummies on the Possibly Mediating Variables
Table A6–1: 
Possible mediators in the relationship between transformation and instrumental/utilitarian mo-
tivation for violence regressed on the specific city dummies, reference category Hamburg
...........
Ljubljana
Volgograd
Plzen
Kraków
Current parental normative 
 rejection of violence
–0.106**
–0.444***
–0.703***
–0.102**
Current family climate: 
 inconsistent prohibitions
0.538***
0.380***
0.222***
n.s.
Eva Groß
eva_maria.gross@uni-bielefeld.de
Berit Haußmann
haussmann@dji.de
